Original Google Doc:

Scenius Meeting Outline

Themes + Observations:

• Status Games & Social Incentive Mechanisms are key social technologies for Scenius

Questions:

• Do great scenes create mechanisms to “see through” signaling, such that strong signaling doesn’t work to gain status, and people actually need to do the great thing?

Hypotheses:

• Every scene needs a “council of judges” which confers status
• The Thielian perspective: "competition is for losers" seems to apply to most great scenes. (they play new games, and create new incentive landscapes, create "cultural monopoly")
  • Conjecture: any successful new science starts as a new game that a specific group of people love to play with one another. The incentives of that game shape the field.

Other Notes:

• Observations on Recruitment + Filtering mechanisms
• Scenes can create a cycle of indebtedness through a favor economy, which can crash once people have expectations of one another that are unrealistic

Outputs:

Draft Thread: "Great Scenes Play Different Games"